There is a long tradition of fruitful interaction between logic and social choice theory. In recent years, much of this interaction has focused on computer-aided methods such as SAT solving and interactive theorem proving. In this paper, we report on the development of a framework for formalizing voting theory in the Lean theorem prover, which we have applied to verify properties of a recently studied voting method. While previous applications of interactive theorem proving to social choice have focused on the (...) verification of impossibility theorems, we aim to cover a variety of results ranging from impossibility theorems to the verification of properties of specific voting methods. In order to formalize voting theoretic axioms concerning adding or removing candidates and voters, we work in a variable-election setting whose formalization makes use of dependent types in Lean. (shrink)

Critics of marcus singer's deduction of the generalization argument from the principle of consequences and the generalization principle ("generalization in ethics," page 66) insist that his use of "everyone" in that deduction is ambiguous, I.E., "everyone" is used both collectively and distributively, And that the deduction is invalid. In this paper, I provide a valid deduction of the generalization argument from those premises which avoids this difficulty entirely. I argue that the conclusion so deduced is logically and morally equivalent to (...) singer's. (shrink)

This paper explores whether it is possible to use Kant's writings on law and his Principle of Right to develop a theory of tort liability for the unintended harmful consequences to other persons that materialize from the wrongful risks created by human actions. The paper uses PR to identify such risks, and imputes to their authors the wrongful hindrances of other persons that result from them. PR protects the freedom of action of human agents, but it also permits them to (...) exercise that freedom by assuming or consenting to the creation of risks towards themselves, and the harms that materialize from such risks are imputed to those voluntary risk bearers. The paper also explains how PR entails both strict liability and negligence, in different domains of tort law, as standards of tort liability, so that neither of those standards is the fundamental principle of tort law; that principle, instead, appears to be the the Principle of Right. Der Beitrag untersucht, ob es möglich ist, Kants Rechtslehre und sein Allgemeines Prinzip des Rechts zu benutzen, um eine Theorie der deliktischen Haftung für Fahrlässigkeitstaten zu entwickeln. Fahrlässigkeitstaten sind rechtswidrige menschliche Handlungen, die unbeabsichtigt Gefahren für andere verursachen, durch die schädliche Folgen für diese anderen entstehen. Der Artikel benutzt das Allgemeine Prinzip des Rechts, um solche Risiken festzustellen und ihren Urhebern die daraus resultierenden rechtswidrigen Verletzungen anderer Personen zuzurechnen. Das Prinzip schützt die Handlungsfreiheit. Aber es erlaubt den handelnden Personen auch, diese ihre Freiheit auszuüben, insofern es ihnen gestattet, Risiken für sich selbst zu schaffen. Die dadurch entstehenden Schäden werden dem Handelnden auch zugerechnet, weil er die entsprechenden Gefahren freiwillig übernommen hat. Der Artikel erklärt, wie das Allgemeine Prinzip des Rechts in den verschiedenen Bereichen des Deliktsrechts bald eine Gefährdungshaftung, bald eine Haftung für Fahrlässigkeit begründet. Keiner dieser Standards enthält das eigentliche Grundprinzip des Deliktsrechts. Das Grundprinzip ist statt dessen Kants Allgemeines Prinzip des Rechts. (shrink)

Preface, by N. Foerster.--The pretensions of science, by L. T. More.--Humanism: an essay at definition, by I. Babbitt.--The humility of common sense, by P. E. More.--The pride of modernity, by G. R. Elliott.--Religion without humanism, by T. S. Eliot.--The plight of our arts, by F. J. Mather, Jr.--The dilemma of modern tragedy, by A. R. Thompson.--An American tragedy, by R. Shafer.--Pandora's box in American fiction, by H. H. Clark.--Dionysus in dismay, by S. P. Chase.--Our critical spokesmen, by G. B. (...) Munson.--Behaviour and continuity, by B. Bandler, II.--The well of discipline, by S. B. Gass.--Courage and education, by R. L. Brown.--A list of books (p. 291-294). (shrink)

Some years ago Ed Freeman and William Evan wrote an article offering a Kantian stakeholder theory of corporate responsibility. Ed was kind enough to allow Tom Beauchamp and me to publish that previously unpublished piece in the second edition of Ethical Theory and Business. That article has appeared in every subsequent edition. But a Kantian theory of stakeholder relationships is not, I believe, a complete Kantian theory of the modem corporation. I believe Ed originally intended to expand that paper into (...) a larger project but Ed’s philosophical interest in pragmatism has distanced him from Kantianism and his writings in stakeholder theory have gone in a different direction. Indeed in this postmodem feminist anti-foundationalist age, Kant is very much out of fashion. Since I am always out of fashion I had no trouble promising Ed I would complete the Kantian piece of the project. This essay is the condensed version and a partial fulfillment of my promise. A Kantian always keeps his promises. (shrink)

In this article we examine the changing relationship to risk as revealed by the covid-19 pandemic and the ways this has, and may in future, alter sacramental practice, considering the radical effects this could have on traditional Christian practice. We consider the cultural trends that may lie behind this developing approach to risk, examining this in the context of an emergent transhuman identity that is technologically moderated and seeks to overcome risks of human mortality.

Albert Carr’s contention that business and individual behavior within business can be understood through an analogy with a game of poker suffers from two central deficiencies. The first is conceptual: in his account, Carr slips between a discussion of games and a discussion of poker as thought they were interchangeable. However, “bluffing,” which is the only concept that Carr is interested in, is actually a mode of play, particular to a subset of games. The second deficiency is one of scale: (...) Carr’s account elides the difference between business understood as a practical domain and business understood from the standpoint of one of the participants or “players” within that domain. These two deficiencies are tacitly invoked by Norman Gillespie in his critique of Carr’s argument. However, Gillespie’s counter-claim – that business is a limited aspect of a more general ethical domain whose rules ought to be able to be shaped by its subjects – fails to pursue the conceptual shortcomings of Carr’s argument far enough. Beginning with Gillespie’s critique, this essay will use Gilles Deleuze’s image of the dice-throw (drawn from Heraclitus and Nietzsche) in order to argue that, 1) the concept of play is not synonymous with bluffing (the latter being only a limited aspect of the former); 2) the concept of play conceptualizes the always incomplete domain of ethics; 3) the incompletion of the ethical domain is not a function of relativism, but of the insufficiency of concepts to completely encompass empirical events; and 4) that business is a particular ethical domain circumscribed not by bluffing, but by a set of rules that overcodes moral evaluations with economic ones. (shrink)

This paper argues against the realization principle, which reifies the realization relation between lower-level and higher-level properties. It begins with a review of some principles of naturalistic metaphysics. Then it criticizes some likely reasons for embracing the realization principle, and finally it argues against the principle directly. The most likely reasons for embracing the principle depend on the dubious assumption that special science theories cannot be true unless special science predicates designate properties. The principle itself turns out to be false (...) because the realization relation fails the naturalistic test for reality: it makes no causal difference to the world.Footnote11This paper resulted from work done at John Heil's 2006 Mind and Metaphysics NEH Summer Seminar at Washington University in St. Louis. An early version of it was presented in a special symposium on realization at the 2007 meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. I owe thanks to all the participants in both events for helpful discussions, and I owe particular thanks to Ken Aizawa, Torin Alter, Jason Ford, Carl Gillett, John Heil, Nicholas Helms, Pete Mandik, John Post, Gene Witmer, Michelle Wrenn, Tad Zawidzki, and two anonymous referees for the AJP. (shrink)

A study of the tradition of ethical socialism, its successes, its failures, and its relevance to contemporary Britain. It focuses on a group of writers who, although separated by time, all promoted this brand of socialism. It chronicles their thoughts and theories, and examines their intentions.

This memorial essay on the French historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot (1922–2010) explores his life and work. Starting out from an ecclesiastical background and education, Hadot's interest in mysticism led him to study the late Greek Neoplatonists Plotinus and Porphyry, as well as the Latin Church Fathers. Elected first to the École pratique des hautes études and then to the Collège de France, Hadot developed his most influential idea, that ancient philosophy was not the construction of an abstract system of (...) ideas, but a concrete, lived practice intended to transform the perception and being of the practitioner, and thereby to ensure his or her happiness. Later in his career, Hadot, influenced by German Romanticism and above all by Goethe, turned to study the history of the concept of nature from classical to modern times. The breadth of his interests and the novelty of his approach account for the wide interest in his works, extending to circles that extend far beyond the disciplines of classical studies and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Just Doctoring: Medical Ethics in the Liberal State. By Troyen A. Brennan. The Ends of Human Life: Medical Ethics in a Liberal Polity. By Ezekiel J. Emanuel.

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